The Irish Famine and The English

My original comment on Mags blog about apologies for past demeanours etc was originally meant as light-hearted but it was seized upon by Span and I seem to have been drawn into some sort of intellectual duel which I can't possibly hope to win.

The question of whether the English government could have done more to alleviate the suffering of the Irish peoples during 1846 and 1847 is an emotional one. When I have discussed this before with people who have no sympathy whatsoever with the Irish the response is nearly always "it was there own fault." A statement which I think is not only ignorant, ill-informed but also appallingly insensitive.

I must declare a personal interest here, my 3 x great grandmother was born in Ireland in 1847 and was one of the lucky ones in that she came to England as a baby, she wasn't so lucky when she got here as recent research has revealed but that's for another day. I don't consider myself as Irish though as she and her father are the only people out of 583 on my family tree spanning nine generations who weren't born in England.

I have used the word 'subjugation' in connection with what the English government did beacuse I strongly believe that was the case. On Mags blog, in response to Span Ows, I have listed three academic works and I think from the three authors names you could possibly deduce they may be influenced by their own heritage. There are plenty of English scholars who dispute the view of events that I agree with, but history is not a science it is about interpretation, for every person who thinks bombing Dresden into oblivion was good because it crucially undermined the morale of the German people, so there are ten others who will say it was the worst act of barbarism ever committed by this country during wartime.

I respect the views of Span or what anybody thinks about the subject. I have mine which are based on reading various accounts over the years and are not the result of some politically correct historical revisionism. Below is an extract from an article that appeared in BBC's history magazine

Taken From The Irish Famnine by Jim Donnelly

Political inertia

Before examining this issue of ideology in the 1840s and 1850s, however, we should review what the British government might have done to mitigate the natural catastrophe arising from repeated ravages of potato blight..

First, the government might have prohibited the export of grain from Ireland, especially during the winter of 1846-47 and early in the following spring, when there was little food in the country and before large supplies of foreign grain began to arrive. Once there was sufficient food in the country (imported Indian corn or maize), from perhaps the beginning of 1848, the government could have taken steps to ensure that this imported food was distributed to those in greatest need. Second, the government could have continued its so-called soup-kitchen scheme for a much longer time. It was in effect for only about six months, from March to September 1847. As many as three million people were fed daily at the peak of this scheme in July 1847. The scheme was remarkably inexpensive and effective. It should not have been dismantled after only six months and in spite of the enormous harvest deficiency of 1847.

Third, the wages that the government paid on its vast but short-lived public works in the winter of 1846-47 needed to be much higher if those toiling on the public works were going to be able to afford the greatly inflated price of food. Fourth, the poor-law system of providing relief, either within workhouses or outside them, a system that served as virtually the only form of public assistance from the autumn of 1847 onwards, needed to be much less restrictive. All sorts of obstacles were placed in the way, or allowed to stand in the way, of generous relief to those in need of food. This was done in a horribly misguided effort to keep expenses down and to promote greater self-reliance and self-exertion among the Irish poor.

Fifth, the government might have done something to restrain the ruthless mass eviction of families from their homes, as landlords sought to rid their estates of pauperized farmers and labourers. Altogether, perhaps as many as 500,000 people were evicted in the years from 1846 to 1854. The government might also have provided free passages and other assistance in support of emigration to North America - for those whose personal means made this kind of escape impossible.

Last, and above all, the British government should have been willing to treat the famine crisis in Ireland as an imperial responsibility and to bear the costs of relief after the summer of 1847. Instead, in an atmosphere of rising 'famine fatigue' in Britain, Ireland at that point and for the remainder of the famine was thrown back essentially on its own woefully inadequate resources.